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Abstract 
This article discusses the development of ‘heterodox’ economics at universities in Germany since the 1970s. 
Based on Lakatos’ concept of scientific research programmes (SRP), the article introduces a classification of 
economics in order to clarify the understanding of variety within economics, especially in the case of Germany. 
Based on this classification and taking into account the different kinds of capital (economic, social and symbolic) 
available to heterodox economists, this article aims to show how heterodox economics in Germany has 
developed from the early 1970s until the present day. It will be shown that the heterodox schools expanded in the 
1970s, but marginalisation took hold again by the 1980s and ultimately left German heterodox economics in a 
state of near-extinction today. From this, it follows that the history of heterodoxy in Germany is an unequal 
‘battle of the paradigms’, and can only be told as the story of a failure. 
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1 Introduction 
So-called ‘mainstream’ economics has come increasingly under attack since the recent 
economic crises that began in 2007/2008. Consequently, critics from within economics are 
increasingly enjoying public attention. However, the criticism of the ‘mainstream’ is not a 
completely new phenomenon, as is best illustrated by the example of the well-known ‘Plea for 
a Pluralistic and Rigorous Economics’ published in the American Economic Review in 1992 
(Abramovitz et al. 1992). Interestingly, most of the past arguments against the ‘mainstream’ 
are still in use. This raises the question of why a ‘mainstream’ has persisted that is criticised 
for almost the same things as decades before. In addition, although alternative streams of 
economics are nowadays enjoying increasing public attention, they obviously (still) suffer 
marginalisation within the academic world, especially within economics. This is astonishing, 
because the optimistic mood of the 1960s once resulted in the establishment of some (reform) 
universities and the appointment of some economists with Marxist, Post Keynesian and neo-
Ricardian backgrounds. So what happened to these economists who represent(ed) an 
alternative way of economic thinking? 
 
Against this background, a research project investigated the development of heterodox 
economics at German universities since the 1970s.1 The analysis itself was of a heterodox 
character because it took account of the institutional environment of the heterodox hotspots in 
Germany (policy at the local and federal level, history, etc.) and the categories of capital in 
Bourdieu’s terms (1991; 1992). 
 
The following article is based on this research. It is structured as follows. Section 2 describes 
the subject of research, i.e. who was analysed, what kind of universities were analysed, etc. 
Section 3 is concerned with the question of who is ‘heterodox’, i.e. it presents and explains 
our classification and then introduces the group of people which has been analysed. Section 4 
gives a short introduction to the historical and institutional background to the academic 
situation from the end of World War II to the 1970s, which marks the starting point of our 
analysis. Section 5 then describes the situation of heterodox economists in Germany from the 
1970s until the present day. Section 6 elaborates these findings by concentrating on the 
economic, social and symbolic capital which was (or was not) available to the German 
heterodox economists. The final section, 7, concludes with some remarks about the 
significance of our findings. 
 
2 Who was analysed? 
The project concentrated on scientists who were employed at German universities. 
Economists who worked at universities of applied sciences (in German: Fachhochschulen), 
business schools (Berufsakademien) and the like were not included. The reason for this 
limitation is that the latter institutions of higher education are not normally allowed to confer 
PhDs and, more importantly in the German academic world, they are not allowed to confer a 
Habilitation, the qualification required to become a university professor. While a PhD 
typically paves the way for an academic career, the Habilitation is a necessary condition in 
order to become a full professor at German universities. Consequently, complete academic 
reproduction only results from being a professor at a German ‘full’ university. 
 
For the same reason, the project concentrated on professors in the sense of full professors, 
adjunct/associate professors and German assistant professors or their current equivalent: 
                                                 
1 See Heise, Sander and Thieme (2016). The project was financially supported by the Hans-Böckler Foundation 
(number: 2012-575-1). 
3 
‘junior professors’.2 These professors were (statistically) analysed from their first official 
appointment until their retirement. Hence, ‘senior’ professors, who are retired but nonetheless 
still engaged in research, were not included. 
 
A further limitation is the exclusive focus on professors who were employed in economics 
departments because the project was interested in the heterodoxy that is accepted as belonging 
to economics. Therefore, economists employed at non-economics departments are associated 
with the decision to leave (or being forced to leave) economics altogether. In addition, 
economists working in other disciplines are typically not recognised as economists by 
economists working in economics, i.e. the former are no longer associated with economics 
and their criticism seems to be regarded as distant from current economics. 
 
The project covers a period of time from about the 1960s to 2013/2014. Since official data 
from the ‘Vademecum’ – a semi-official statistical record of all professors, lecturers, etc. at 
German universities – contained some inconsistencies, the development of heterodox 
economics was mainly reconstructed from the curriculum vitae of each identified heterodox 
economist. This data was completed by and compared to additional information from the 
official webpage of the chair/person, commemorative publications and the like. Since 
information about social capital in terms of staff (postdocs, postgraduate students), the 
acquisition of third-party funding, etc. is typically not available from official data, the project 
also interviewed the (still) living heterodox economists by means of a questionnaire. At the 
end, 57 individuals were identified as being heterodox (for the classification, see the next 
paragraph) and 21 of them participated in an additional questionnaire.3 
 
3 Defining ‘heterodoxy’ 
According to Imre Lakatos (1974) and Paul Feyerabend (1975), the evolution or development 
of an academic discipline is based on a multitude of paradigms, where the proponents of a 
paradigm play the role of warriors in a ‘battle of paradigms’ (Lakatos) that is fought for a 
better interpretation or approximation of reality. Lakatos’ concept of scientific research 
programmes (SRP) was used in the project as a framework within which the following 
dimensions of classification can be described (Table 1): 
1. Firstly, the dimension of a particular methodology which is regarded as acceptable (and 
therefore scientific). 
2. Another dimension can be described in epistemological terms: certain core assumptions 
(axioms) underlying the formation of models. 
3. Finally, there is a ‘negative heuristic’, according to which the postulates of the research 
programme, which have been derived from the core assumptions, are not (allowed to be) 
called into question. 
 
Note that categorisations that take account of the aforementioned dimensions are hard to find 
within discussion about heterodox and mainstream economics.4 
 
                                                 
2 Assistant and ‘junior’ professors became/become a professor without needing to complete a Habilitation; it is 
near-equivalent to the concept of tenure track that is well known in the English-speaking world. 
3 Note that there are individual cases of incomplete information. Consequently, the number of analysed 
individuals can differ from the sample mentioned in the text (i.e. 57 and 21 individuals). To avoid 
misunderstandings, our work concentrates on influential factors on the development of heterodox economics in 
Germany in general, thus we do not want to engage in a discussion about individual, anecdotal cases of 
heterodox economists. A complete list of the German heterodox economists who were analysed can be found in 
Heise, Sander and Thieme (2016). 
4 Lawson (2006), Lee (2012) and Colander, Hold and Rosser (2003) also provide categorisations, but they are 
different from ours. 
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As claimed by the aforementioned ‘Plea for a Pluralistic and Rigorous Economics’ 
(Abramovitz et al. 1992), the mainstream in economics can be taken as the ‘paradigm’ or 
scientific research programme of ‘dynamic stochastic general equilibrium ’ (DSGE), usually 
associated with ‘neoclassical economics’. Note that (simplified versions of) this paradigm 
also constitutes the canon in the widely used textbooks by (mainly) American authors (e.g. 
Mankiw’s Introduction to Economics and Samuelson and Nordhaus’ Economics).5  
 
This DSGE paradigm is (i) methodologically based on the exclusive acceptance of a formal 
mathematical-deductive, positivist reductionism (Lawson 2006). Following the ‘empirical 
turn’ of the last two or three decades, sophisticated micro- and macroeconometrics, and/or 
experimental arrangements which are familiar from the leading natural sciences (physics and 
chemistry) were incorporated (Schmidt and aus dem Moore 2010), (ii) the epistemological 
dimension of the DSGE paradigm can be described in terms of assumptions of rationality, 
ergodicity and substitutionality (Davidson 1984). These axioms constitute the ‘core’ of the 
paradigm. Finally, (iii) the dimension of the ‘negative heuristic’ of the DSGE paradigm is the 
postulate of macroeconomic stability and market clearing (Walras’ Law), which is 
implemented a priori in the core assumptions and serves as a ‘model solution’.6 
 
Based on these considerations the mainstream can be described as a DSGE paradigm that is 
based on: (i) the acceptance of the ‘standard methodological toolkit’, i.e. formal 
mathematical-deductive, positivist reductionism and/or highly developed 
empiricism/experimentalism; (ii) the acceptance of the core assumptions, namely rationality, 
ergodicity and substitutionality; and (iii) the acceptance of Walras’ Law as a ‘negative 
heuristic’. The latter in particular marks the line of demarcation between DSGE mainstream 
and economic heterodoxy. This means that a paradigmatic change requires the rejection of the 
‘negative heuristic’; merely having doubts about assumptions within the ‘protective belt’ is 
not sufficient for being heterodox. Economists who exhibit doubts about rationality, 
ergodicity and substitutionality, while at the same time remaining loyal to the ‘negative 
heuristic’ of the DSGE paradigm, belong to the ‘grey area’ that is often called ‘dissenters’. 
‘Dissenters’ typically do not raise any fundamental criticism of the mainstream and use 
methods/ techniques (mathematics, modelling, etc.) similar to the mainstream, so that they are 
recognised by mainstream economists who often present these ‘dissenters’ as the dynamic 
front line of mainstream research (Colander, Holt and Rosser 2009).7 However, these 
variations within the ‘protective belt’ are often presented in a way that has made others fail to 
see that they nevertheless accept the ‘negative heuristic’. This applies (partly) to behavioural 
economics, evolutionary economics, neuroeconomics and the economics of complexity and 
approaches explicitly based on assumptions of limited rationality and the like. On the one 
hand this means that mainstream economists attempt to incorporate non-mainstream ideas and 
                                                 
5 Comments by some referees showed that this statement may be capable of being misunderstood. We are well 
aware that there is not a unique (‚standard‘) DSGE model but rather many (which is why we speak of DSGE 
paradigm rather than theory). And we are also aware that most textbooks simplify their presentations by 
providing static General Equilibrium models which we consider as belonging to the DSGE paradigm. Therefore, 
we agree with Olivier Blanchard (2016: 1) in that „DSGE models have come to play a dominant role in 
macroeconomic research“. 
6 Again, in order to prevent misunderstandings, it should be noted that the heuristic dimension of a paradigm is 
not about ascertained model outcomes of a particular configuration but about ‚ideal types‘ in the sense of 
Arrow/Hahn (1971: 325) or Weber (1922). 
7 Both Kuhn’s ‘paradigm’ and Lakatos’ ‘scientific research programmes’ are terminologically ambiguous. Here 
we wish to understand the concepts as efforts to explain the economy as a whole, in which all aspects of 
economics are embedded – theories of the labour market, distribution and growth, as well as theories of foreign 
trade, money or finance. From this perspective, however, it seems questionable whether, for example, 
behavioural economics or the economics of complexity actually constitute independent paradigms, or whether 
they are merely partial theories, which may in some cases have connections to various paradigms. 
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methods/ techniques into the mainstream framework while still accepting the ‘negative 
heuristic’. On the other hand, the adoption by the mainstream can be turned into a hostile 
takeover, where the mainstream increasingly gains dominance and strips the once ‘alternative’ 
movement of economics off any ‘heterodox’ character. This problem can be best associated 
with the difficulties in categorising evolutionary economics as being ‘heterodox’ (see, for 
instance, Dürmeier and Euler 2013). Against this background, the analysis of the ‘dissenters’ 
would have required a lot of extra work that was not possible within the scope of the project. 
Table 1 (below) takes them into account using the notion of being ‘partially’ affiliated with 
heterodoxy or dissenters. 
 
Interestingly, there are some other dissenters within the mainstream who share its core axioms 
and the optimistic belief in stability and market-clearing, but not the mainstream’s standard 
methodological toolkit. The German Ordnungsökonomik (‘Ordo’-economics or economics of 
order) and the Austrian School based on the work of Hayek are examples of this category of 
dissenters. They are largely marginalised as though worthy, yet methodically weak and no 
longer up to date (Schmidt and aus dem Moore 2010, p. 170). 
 
[Table 1 near here] 
 
Consequently, heterodoxy is based on: (i) the necessary condition of rejecting the 
mainstream’s ‘negative heuristic’, i.e. the stability of market clearing as a ‘model solution’ 
(repudiation of Walras’ Law8); (ii) the rejection of some (or all) of the assumptions within the 
mainstream’s ‘protective belt’; and (iii) methodological openness with regard to less formal, 
more narrative deduction and inductive or abductive techniques. The latter does not mean that 
heterodox economists must reject formal techniques/ mathematics. In contrast to mainstream 
economics, however, formalistic techniques are not taken as the only means of getting 
scientific insights in heterodox economics. As a result, there are heterodox economists using 
formal techniques, but we can also find heterodox economists who are more familiar with 
inductive and abductive techniques or more narrative deduction. Theoretical schools that can 
undoubtedly be regarded as heterodox and which are important for the German-speaking 
world include post-Keynesianism, neo-Marxist regulation theory, and theories of socio-
economics. 
 
As mentioned earlier, heterodox economists from the camp of dissenters (evolutionary 
economics and economics of complexity) are analysed insofar as they were easily identifiable 
within the framework of the project. Although ‘feminist economics’ is listed as a current 
heterodox approach by the JEL classification code B54, it was not associated here with an 
independently heterodox approach. Note that some of the feminist approaches belong to the 
mainstream (neoclassical feminist approaches) and are, therefore, not heterodox; other 
feminist approaches can be associated with pre-existing approaches from the heterodox camp 
of economics such as old institutionalism or Marx-inspired approaches (e.g. against the 
background of the discussion of whether household chores would also produce added value 
like ‘normal’ waged work). 
 
4 The situation of economics from the end of World War II until the 1970s 
After World War II, the academic landscape in Germany suffered from the moral failings of 
academics who became close to the Nazi regime and lost their neutrality and autonomy 
                                                 
8 The insight that a real paradigmatic alternative implies the rejection of Walras’ Law goes back to Robert 
Clower (1965). But even before that, ‘heterodox’ economists such as Karl Marx or Thomas Robert Malthus had 
begun to question the classical predecessor of Walras’ Law, Say’s Law; for the relationship between Walras’ 
Law and Say’s Law, see Mishan (1963). 
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(Wolbring 2007, p. 73). There was also a very substantial loss of academic excellence because 
a lot of scientists were forced to emigrate for political, religious and racial reasons; Krohn 
(2002, p. 437) estimates that about 20 percent of those who held the office of (full) professors 
in 1930 and subsequently left Germany showed little interest in remigration after the downfall 
of the Nazi regime (Krohn 2002, p. 443). As a result, there was a ‘natural’ demand for new 
and ethically acceptable academics after the end of World War II. In the face of the enormous 
increase in student numbers between the 1950s and the 1960s the number of students doubled 
from 100,000 to 200,000 – the demand for academic professionals had to grow as well. 
 
Later, with the student movement, this situation culminated in reform processes in Germany’s 
academic landscape. This found expression firstly in a (retrospectively) temporary openness 
in recruitment practices. The existing ‘supply’ of scientists with a Habilitation did not satisfy 
the high demand for professorial candidates, so the recruitment conditions were modified so 
that scientists who had only completed a PhD could be appointed to the post of professor. As 
a result, around a fifth of all university professors had not completed a Habilitation in the 
mid-1970s (Hesse 2007, p. 124). 
 
The aforementioned reform process also resulted in the foundation of ‘reform universities’ 
and the influence of reform-oriented status groups within traditional ‘old’ universities. The 
latter can clearly be attributed to the short-lived principle of Drittelparität (one-third parity), 
i.e. the substantial involvement of student or research assistant representatives in decision-
making bodies at universities (with respect to appointing professors, etc.). 
 
[Figure 1 near here] 
 
Consequently, the general expansion of academic staff at German universities also meant a 
greater chance to appoint heterodox professors. However, there was not a nationwide 
pluralisation of economics, but rather a heterogenisation of both the access routes and the 
paradigmatic orientation of the professorships, with considerable regional variation. The latter 
especially applies to the two ‘strongholds’ of heterodoxy in Germany, the University of 
Bremen and the Hochschule für Wirtschaft und Politik (HWP) in Hamburg both of which had 
be founded with clear socio-political aspirations. 
 
This process of pluralisation was accompanied by the foundation of heterodox organisations 
such as numerous local ‘Rote Zellen Ökonomie’ (Red Cells for Economics) and, prominently, 
the ‘Arbeitsgruppe Alternative Wirtschaftspolitik’ (Working Group for Alternative Economic 
Policy, also referred to as the Memogruppe) and the ‘Arbeitskreis Politische Ökonomie’ 
(German Association of Political Economy). New journals with pluralistic or ‘critical’ 
aspirations were founded as well, for instance: Mehrwert, Prokla, Hefte für Politische 
Ökonomie, Das Argument and Leviathan. 
 
In addition, the criticism of the neoclassical synthesis and the work of Piero Sraffa at the time 
resulted in the revival of Keynes and interest in Marxian and (neo-)Ricardian theory. 
Therefore economics in general was increasingly confronted with problems, insights and 
ideas that supported (at least) a discussion of different approaches. As a result, different 
heterodox research programmes appeared during the 1970s and 1980s, for instance: 
- The research programme of ‘monetary Keynesianism’, which tried to reconstruct 
theorising along the lines of the General Theory and tried to formulate a paradigmatic 
alternative to mainstream barter or exchange theory (see Heise 1990)  
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- The research programme of neo-Ricardianism, which tried to combine the classical theory 
of value and distribution with Keynes’ principle of effective demand (see Kalmbach and 
Kurz 1983) 
- The research programme of ‘radical economics’, which tried to combine Keynesian and 
Marxian theories of crisis to form broad interventions in markets and property relations 
(see Künzel, Ipsen and Rohwer 1985; Hickel 1979; Huffschmid 1979) 
- The research programme of ‘evolutionary institutionalism’, which tried to combine socio-
economic and institutional theories in order to embed market allocation in social contexts 
and to reject the axioms of rationality and ergodicity (Elsner 1986; Elsner 2009) 
 
These examples of heterodox research programmes clearly show that heterodox economics is 
not restricted to criticising the mainstream and bemoaning its own marginalisation. 
 
5 What happened to heterodox economics in Germany after the 1970s? 
The situation of German universities during the 1970s can give the impression of amenable 
conditions for heterodox economics. But how were heterodox economists distributed 
throughout German universities (see Figure 1 above)? 
 
[Table 2 near here] 
 
[Figure 2 near here] 
 
As Table 2 and Figure 2 show, the appearance of heterodox economists at traditional old 
universities in Germany was in most cases a result of pure chance. There was, however, a 
slightly higher chance for heterodox economists to be appointed at traditional old universities 
where groups with a socio-political orientation (students and academic assistants) had a strong 
influence in decision-making bodies or at newly founded universities that aimed at social 
openness and practical relevance. The situation also seemed to be a bit better at newly 
founded universities that followed the ideal of Humboldt (‘research oriented universities’). 
Obviously (and not surprisingly), heterodox economists had the best chance of being 
appointed professor at ‘reform universities’ with aspirations to reform in relation to their 
socio-political orientation. The latter applies to the (former) heterodox ‘strongholds’, the 
University of Bremen and the HWP in Hamburg. 
 
As seen in Table 2 and Figure 2, heterodox economists were virtually unrepresented at three 
quarters of all German universities with economics faculties or departments; of the remaining 
quarter, nearly 30% consisted of the two ‘bastions’ of heterodoxy (Bremen and HWP). The 
pluralisation is not only extremely unequal but quantitatively limited: on the basis of our 
research, we estimate that since the 1970s at no point in time have there been more than 10% 
of economics professors at German universities who can be associated with the heterodox 
camp. 
 
[Figure 3 near here] 
 
Ultimately, the development of heterodox economics only tells a story of further 
marginalisation (Figure 3): the number of appointments of heterodox economists after the 
1970s declined rapidly,9 and the number of heterodox economists shrank more and more as 
the ‘first generation’ grew old and retired. 
                                                 
9 The 1990s as presented in Figure 3 should not be interpreted as an ‘interim high’; instead they hint at the 
quantitative extent of ‘accidental’ appointments. The low number of heterodox appointments in the 1980s is due 
to the high degree of saturation of the university market after the wave of new universities had been founded.  
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[Table 3 near here] 
 
After the collapse of the German Democratic Republic (GDR), some heterodox economists 
might have associated the process of reorganisation of the universities within the territory of 
the ex-GDR with the hope of stabilising the population of heterodox economists. However, 
such hope quickly faded away. In fact, heterodox economists were completely overlooked 
when the economics faculties of East German universities were re-founded in the early 1990s 
(Table 3).  
 
Moreover, the heterodox character of the two ‘strongholds’ of heterodox economics (Bremen 
and HWP) also faded away: one was practically shut down as a unit for teaching 
undergraduate economics, and the other was adapted to the mainstream by being converted 
into another (more mainstream) organisational unit just at the time of the generational 
changeover when new professorial appointments were due. 
 
6 Which elements characterise the weakness of German heterodoxy? 
The increasing marginalisation of heterodox economics at German universities poses the 
question of the reasons for its weakness. According to Bourdieu’s framework, especially with 
respect to his differentiation of capital (Bourdieu 1991; 1992), the weakness of German 
heterodoxy can be attributed to the more or less insufficient endowment in terms of economic 
capital (financial situation and academic staff), social capital and symbolic capital. As a 
result, heterodox economists have found themselves placed within an uneven ‘field of power’. 
In other words: if the academic history is associated with a ‘battlefield of paradigms’ 
(Lakatos), heterodox economists are less well armed than their opponents in the dominant 
mainstream.  
 
[Table 4 near here] 
 
The insufficiency of endowment in terms of economic capital can be seen in the lack of 
access to financial resources from the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG) – the German 
(public) research funding institution – which is the most important source of funding for 
academic work in Germany today (Table 4). Many heterodox economists have submitted 
research proposals to the DFG, but their chance of success is low, or in any case lower than 
for applications to alternative research funding institutions (Table 4): according to the 
project’s survey, only 17% of DFG applications by heterodox economists were fully 
approved, as opposed to 57% of applications to alternative research foundations (e.g. the 
Hans-Böckler Foundation and the Volkswagen Foundation). 50% of all applications to the 
DFG were completely rejected, as opposed to only 7% of applications to alternative external 
sources.  
 
The ability to acquire research funds is very important for academic ‘reproduction’, especially 
where universities do not provide their professors with regular financial resources sufficient to 
employ postgraduates or postdocs. The financial resources required to employ postdocs play a 
key role in determining academic ‘reproduction’ in Germany: If a professor is not provided 
with financial resources to employ a postdoc, he or she will not be able to support the 
academic career of promising PhDs. 
 
The financial resources that are provided obviously relate to the category of ‘economic 
capital’. On the basis of this category, it can be shown that heterodox economists were 
disadvantaged compared with the representatives of the mainstream. This is best illustrated by 
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a comparison between the two ‘strongholds’ of orthodoxy and heterodoxy, the universities of 
Bonn and Bremen.10 The reform universities where heterodox economists were most likely to 
be found provided far fewer resources to the appointed professors than the traditional 
‘professorial’ or ‘full’ universities (Ordinarienuniversitäten).11 In the case of the University 
of Bremen, at least in its founding phase, this can be attributed to the political attitude and 
desire to break with the habits of the traditional old universities, where the professors treat 
their employees like the ‘Sun King’ treats his servants.12 Consequently, professors at such 
reform universities had more teaching responsibilities and could not employ additional 
members of staff. 
 
In places where heterodox economists had access to resources comparable to mainstream 
economists (e.g. the University of Bielefeld), the ‘production’ of disciples was made difficult, 
at least at the level of the Habilitation. And even in those places where reproduction was 
successful as far as the Habilitation was concerned (at old and comparatively well-resourced 
universities such as the University of Frankfurt or the FU Berlin), those who had gained their 
Habilitation seldom achieved the breakthrough to a regular professorship. Such scholars have 
often chosen alternative strategies: emigrating, moving into professorships at universities of 
applied sciences, or even shifting to other departments (sociology, political science) – in the 
worst case, they quit academia altogether. It is therefore certainly not wrong to speak of a 
disciplinary ‘brain drain’ in heterodox economics, which obviously weakens the position of 
heterodoxy within economics as a whole. This weakening is all the more dramatic because it 
seems doubtful whether those who migrate to other countries or other – neighbouring – 
disciplines will return to the field of economics in Germany. 
 
Note that the capacity for academic reproduction plays a key role in determining endowment 
in terms of social capital, i.e. resources are based on relationships and affiliations to social 
groups. Therefore, heterodox economists will struggle to have large or widespread networks if 
they are not able to ‘produce’ disciples. Being intertwined with symbolic capital (see below), 
although heterodox economists founded new journals and organisations during the 1970s (see 
section 4) this did not establish powerful networks and relationships comparable to the 
networks and relationships of the mainstream economists. These relationships comprise 
connections to and influence on academic, economic or political organisations such as the 
Wissenschaftsrat (German Council of Science and Humanities), the scientific advisory 
councils of the German Federal Government or the Deutsche Bundesbank and the scientific 
advisory boards of federal ministries where heterodox economists were entirely ignored. 
 
                                                 
10 Despite limited information, it is certain that less than ten junior researchers received their Habilitation in 
economics at the economics department at the University of Bremen in the period from 1971 to 2014. In the 
substantially shorter period from 1984 to 2014, more than three times as many economists (over 30) completed a 
Habilitation at the University of Bonn, and most of these went on to obtain a professorship at a German 
university. This is true of less than half of those who did their Habilitation in Bremen.  
11 According to the German Statistical Office, professors of economics in Germany had an average of 3.71 
postgraduate and postdoctoral research staff in 2011 (cf. Statistisches Bundesamt 2012, p. 96). Our survey of 
heterodox professors in Germany found an average of 2.32 research staff. The discrepancy evident here in the 
resourcing of orthodox and heterodox professors is likely to have been even greater in the past: while the average 
level of resourcing is decreasing overall (for the economists at the University of Bonn, the rate was four to five 
research positions per professor in the 1980s and 1990s; cf. Heise, Sander and Thieme 2016), the heterodox 
professors tend to report a slight improvement. Of course this development has to be viewed in the light of the 
above-mentioned zero endowment of many heterodox professorships in the founding phase of the reform 
universities, and a subsequent ‘normalisation’. 
12 It was not until the mid-1980s that a turnaround in staffing policy occurred and the (mainly heterodox) 
professors were granted a small number of positions for research staff. 
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The symbolic capital of heterodox economists can be associated with reputation and academic 
acceptance within economics and society. Although heterodox economists founded new 
journals and organisations during the 1970s, this did not help them to achieve academic 
reputation within the scientific community. This is exemplified by the low ranking of the 
main journals in which heterodox economists mostly publish in the Handelsblatt ranking 
(2013) which is the informal measure of the ‘quality’ of research output in economics in 
Germany. 
 
Moreover, a comparison of the University of Bonn and the University of Bremen also reveals 
the low academic reputation of heterodox economists. For instance, the Frankfurter 
Allgemeine Zeitung’s ranking of economists (FAZ 2014b) that aims to assess the most 
influential economists in Germany also included ‘research’ as a category of performativity. 
Within ‘research’, the ranking did not include any heterodox economist with an academic 
background at the University of Bremen, but it did include four professors at the University of 
Bonn (FAZ 2014a). 
 
As well as these kinds of rankings, reputation could also be achieved by holding 
representative positions within professional organisations that are important for the profession 
of economics. In the German-speaking world, the Verein für Socialpolitik (VfS) is the 
traditional (unofficial) professional organisation of German (or German-speaking) 
economists. 25 of the 57 heterodox economists are (or were) members of the VfS and 
although some of them are actively involved in the VfS, heterodox economists found it 
difficult to get accepted by the VfS, especially in terms of being elected to prestigious 
positions within it (e.g. president). 
 
Finally, symbolic capital can also be associated with important and therefore symbolic 
positions in academia, economic or political organisations, such as the aforementioned 
Wissenschaftsrat (German Council of Science and Humanities) or the scientific advisory 
boards of federal ministries. These positions have remained largely closed to heterodox 
economists. Thanks to the nominating rights of the German trade unions, a few heterodox 
economists have been delegated to the Sachverständigenrat zur Begutachtung der 
gesamtwirtschaftlichen Entwicklung (SVR, German Council of Economic Experts) since it 
was founded in 1963. However, their role has been that of outsiders (Kampe 1983), i.e. 
mainstream economists must accept their participation by law and tradition, but they almost 
certainly regard this as a necessary evil.  
 
7 Conclusion 
The results of our project show that the ‘battle of paradigms’ is not dependent on a ‘true’ or 
‘superior’ theory that would automatically sort out the other ‘wrong’ or ‘inferior’ theories. 
The case of Sraffa already indicates that showing substantiated evidence about the theoretical 
failings of one approach does not necessarily end in the latter’s loss of academic acceptance. 
Our results instead show that the scientific ‘success’ of scientists and, consequently, academic 
collectives of thinking do not or do not only require a correct or ‘true’ scientific theory but are 
also dependent on the institutional and cultural environment, including the economic, social 
and symbolic resources available to scientists and academic (sub-)communities. 
 
Although the student movement called for a climate of openness in the academic landscape in 
Germany at the beginning of the 1970s, it did not result in a nationwide pluralisation of 
economics at German universities, but heterodox economists instead found the door to 
universities was barely open to them. The foundation of heterodox ‘strongholds’ was 
concentrated at a few locations (such as Hamburg and Bremen) and the entire heterodox camp 
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never amounted to more than 10% of economics professors at German universities. Most of 
the heterodox economists who were analysed became professors during the 1970s, when they 
were not necessarily dependent on the Habilitation, but this changed in the 1980s. Our data 
shows a more or less fading wave of heterodoxy, beginning with the greatest amount of 
heterodox economists per decade in the 1970s (22 individuals) and with the number of 
appointed professors then decreasing in the following decades. Finally, in the present day, 
almost no professors of heterodox descent are being appointed any longer. 
 
As well as this quantitative perspective, the results of the project show in detail that heterodox 
economists in Germany have never been bestowed with the economic, social and symbolic 
capital necessary to be a ‘competitive’ counterpart to the mainstream: 
1. Heterodox economists have not been provided with personnel resources sufficient to 
‘reproduce’ themselves (and comparable to their mainstream counterparts). 
2. Heterodox economists have encountered and continue to encounter serious difficulties in 
acquiring third-party funds from the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG) that are 
supposed to be awarded on the basis of academic originality and, therefore, to be 
paradigmatically and methodologically open; however, the funding is actually 
predominantly awarded to mainstream economists. 
3. Consequently, heterodox research and academic reproduction is increasingly absolutely 
dependent on alternative foundations such as the Hans-Böckler Foundation and the 
Volkswagen Foundation. However, acquiring money from the Hans-Böckler Foundation 
in particular runs the risk of being disparaged as a ‘trade union economist’ by the 
economic mainstream, as well as by the media and politicians on the basis of the 
judgements of the economic mainstream. 
4. Heterodox economists founded new journals and professional groups in the 1970s, but 
they were not able to achieve academic acceptance within science, society and politics; 
when heterodox journals are not ignored, they are usually associated with an inferior 
academic value in the Handelsblatt rankings, which are very important in order to pursue 
an academic career in Germany. 
5. The academic work of heterodox economists is usually also rated to be of an inferior 
academic value by rankings such as the FAZ rankings that aim to measure the influence 
and relevance of German economists; most heterodox economists do not appear there. 
6. Heterodox economists do not usually have access to academic, economic or political 
organisations that influence science and society in general (e.g. the German Council of 
Science and Humanities or federal ministries); where law and/or tradition impose the 
inclusion of ‘heterodox’ economists, as in the case of the German Council of Economic 
Experts (delegated by the German trade unions), the ‘heterodox’ or critical economists 
remain a minority and are more or less regarded as court jesters. 
 
Against this background, a ‘fair’ competition of paradigms is still impossible. The ‘battle of 
paradigms’ is instead reduced to a defensive war waged by the mainstream with occasional 
‘skirmishes’ by the heterodox minorities: this is not a ‘battle’ between equal opponents. As 
the results of the project show, if the aim were really a ‘fair’ competition, the government 
would repair the current academic framework and incorporate precautions guaranteeing the 
freedom of science, including the freedom to carry out heterodox research. 
 
All things considered, the history of heterodox economics in Germany is a story of further 
marginalisation. The current situation requires administrative interventions. If such 
interventions fail to appear, the last chapter of the history of heterodox economics in Germany 
will be written in the near future: within the next five to ten years or so. 
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Table 1: Classification of economics 
Core Axioms ‘Negative heuristic’ 
Methodology Classification ‘School’ 
Rationality, 
ergodicity and 
substitutionality 
Walras’ Law, i.e. the 
stability of market 
clearing as a ‘model 
solution’ 
Accepted Accepted  Standard 
economic toolkit 
DSGEM New classical 
macroeconomics 
Neo-Keynesianism 
Standard Keynesianism 
Partly questioned/ 
variations 
Accepted Standard 
economic toolkit 
DSGEM 
dissenters 
Behavioural economics 
(partly) 
Economics of 
complexity (partly) 
Evolutionary 
economics (partly) 
Neuroeconomics 
Accepted Accepted Rejection of the 
standard 
economic toolkit 
DSGEM 
dissenters 
Economics of order 
Austrian School 
 
Accepted and 
appended by the 
assumption of 
asymmetrically 
distributed 
information 
Rejected Standard 
economic toolkit 
Dissenters/het
erodoxy 
Information economics 
Partly questioned/ 
variations 
Rejected Standard 
economic toolkit 
+ other methods/ 
techniques 
(narrative 
analysis, 
abduction, etc.) 
Heterodoxy Post-Keynesianism 
Regulation 
theory/Marxism 
Socio- 
economics/socio-
economic 
institutionalism 
Behavioural economics 
(partly) 
Economics of 
complexity (partly) 
Evolutionary 
economics (partly) 
Accepted 
 
Rejected Standard 
economic toolkit 
Heterodoxy Neo-Ricardianism 
Source: own classifications 
 
 
Table 2: Relative frequency of heterodox economists 
Classification Locations (number) 
Heterodox 
economists 
(number) 
Heterodox 
economists per 
location  
Not classified (traditional old university) 
 43 13 0.3 
Newly founded university based on Humboldtian ideal 2 4 2 
New university founded to relieve pressure on existing 
institutions, no aspirations to reform 12 1 0.1 
Old university strongly influenced by groups with socio-
political orientation 6 8 1.3 
Newly founded university with aspirations to reform in 
relation to social openness and practical relevance 8 12 1.5 
Newly founded university with aspirations to reform in 
relation to socio-political orientation 2 15 7.5 
∑ 73 53  
Average   0.8 
Source: own calculations based on Heise et al. (2015) 
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Table 3: Economics professors at reorganised East German universities 
 Founding dean (disciplinary 
origin) 
Number of 
economics 
professors (today) 
Number of heterodox economics 
professors (per location) 
HU Berlin Wilhelm Krelle (economics) 9 - 
TU Chemnitz Peter Rütger Wossidlo (business 
informatics) 
4 1 
BTU Cottbus/ 
Senftenberg 
Gerhard Duelen (business 
informatics) 
4 1 
TU Dresden Ulrich Blum (economics) 7 - 
U Erfurt Wolfgang Schluchter (sociology) 7 1 
EVU 
Frankfurt/Oder 
Joachim Starbatty (economics) 7 - 
U Greifswald Jürgen Regge (law) 4 - 
U Halle Alfred Schmitt-Rink (economics) 8 - 
U Jena Peter Oberender (economics) 6 - 
U Leipzig Gernot Gutmann 
(economics)/Bert Rürup 
(economics) 
7 1 
TU Magdeburg Alois Wenig (economics) 6 - 
U Potsdam Josef Molsberger 
(economics)/Wilhelm Bürklin 
(political science) 
5 - 
U Rostock Dieter Oberndörfer (political 
science) 
6 - 
Total: 13  80 4 (0.3) 
Source: websites of the relevant faculties; data from July 2014 
 
 
 
Table 4: Research funding for heterodox economists 
Institution Applied for funds 
(in %) 
Approved (in %) 
 Yes No Rejected Partly approved Fully approved 
DFG 60 40 50 33 17 
Alternative 
external sources 75 25 7 26 57 
Source: own calculations based on Heise/Sander/Thieme (2016) 
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Figure 1: ‘Old’ and ‘new’ universities in Germany in the 1970s 
 
 
Figure 2: Distribution of heterodox economists in the university field 
Source: own calculations 
 
Figure 3: Professorial appointments for heterodox economists 1950 to 2013 
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Notes: Habil. = Habilitation; APL = außerplanmäßige (extraordinary, non-tenured) professorships; TR = transformation/ 
converted professorships, resulting from the fusion of universities of applied sciences and universities 
Source: own diagram 
 
 
 
